Klaudia Michalska
Reliability & Safety Engineer · Safety & Reliability
Warsaw, Poland
Reliability & Safety Engineer applying quantitative analysis methods to aerospace system design. Specializes in FMEA/FMECA, Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), and reliability prediction using MIL-HDBK-217 and ECSS standards. Develops safety cases and supports hazard analysis for propulsion and avionics systems.
Expertise
- FMEA and FMECA (functional and hardware level)
- Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and cut set extraction
- reliability prediction (MIL-HDBK-217, ECSS-Q-ST-30)
- safety case development (MIL-STD-882)
- hazard analysis and risk assessment
- MTBF and mission reliability calculation
Technologies
Work History
2024-09
Conducted Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) for new hypergolic propellant handling facility. Identified 28 hazard scenarios, assessed severity and likelihood, defined 34 risk controls and mitigation measures.
Challenge: Hypergolic propellants (MMH/NTO) have limited publicly available accident data. Used a combination of MIL-STD-882 severity tables, published NASA hazard analysis reports, and consultation with a propulsion engineer to assess likelihood.
Learned: Hazard analysis quality depends on domain expertise from the system engineers. A safety engineer working alone produces a checklist; a safety engineer working with propulsion, mechanical, and operations experts produces a real risk assessment.
2024-02
Developed reliability prediction for onboard computer using ECSS-Q-ST-30 (parts count method). Calculated MTBF of 180,000 hours at +20°C. Identified capacitor family as top contributor to failure rate.
Challenge: Several custom ASICs in the design had no published failure rate data. Assigned MIL-HDBK-217 generic IC rates with worst-case quality level — conservative but defensible to the customer.
Learned: Reliability prediction uncertainty is driven by component data quality, not by the calculation method. Document all assumptions and uncertainty sources clearly — customers ask about them during review.
2023-07
Performed Fault Tree Analysis for launcher separation system. Identified minimal cut sets, calculated probability of separation failure using component failure rate data from MIL-HDBK-217.
Challenge: One identified cut set had a probability above the 10⁻⁷/mission requirement. Proposed adding a redundant initiator and recalculated — probability dropped to 3×10⁻⁹. Design change approved at safety review.
Learned: FTA is not just a compliance exercise — it actively drives design improvements. Finding a single cut set that violates probability requirements and having the quantitative data to justify a design change is the real value.
2023-01
Performed hardware FMECA for satellite power distribution unit (PDU) — 180 components analyzed, failure modes and effects identified for each, critical items flagged for design review.
Challenge: Engineers provided component lists without distinguishing between primary and redundant paths. Had to trace schematics manually to determine failure propagation for each mode.
Learned: FMECA quality depends entirely on the quality of the design documentation provided. Starting FMECA before schematics are stable wastes time — establish a drawing freeze before FMECA kickoff.